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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

ROYAL RESOURCES, INC. ,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 15817

vs.
GIBRALTER FINANCIAL CORP. ,
GIBRALTER SECURITIES CORP. ,
(a wholly owned .subsidiary of
Gibral ter Financial Corp. , )
LYNN DIXON, and GEORGE PERRY,
Defendants-Appellants.:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT LYNN DIXON

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Lynn Dixon, appeals from a judgment of the
District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
in favor of the respondent Royal Resources, Inc., in the sum of
~10,400 on non-jury trial,

the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The respondent Royal Resources, Inc., plaintiff below, a
c6rporation, filed suit in the District Court of the Third Judicial
District on November 24, 1975, against Gibralter Financial Corp.,
Gibralter Securities Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Gibralter
Financial Corp. , Lynn Dixon and George Perry, seeking damages
for monies allegedly had by the defendants.

On June 17, 1976,

an amended complaint was duly filed seeking judgment in the sum
of $10,680 from the same named defendants.

(R. 9)

An answer

denying the individual liability of Lynn Dixon and George Perry
was duly filed.

(R. ll)

On the 22nd day of July, 1977, judgment
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-2companies in the sum of $10,680 and trial was reserved against
the individual defendants.

(R. 24)

Non-jury trial was held

as to the liability of Lynn Dixon before the Honorable Jay E.
Banks on the 19th day of April, 1978.

At the time of trial,

plaintiff abandoned its claim against George Perry and pursued
its claim only against Lynn Dixon.

Judgment was entered on

the 15th day of May, 1978, in favor of the respondent and against
the appellant, Lynn Dixon, in the sum of $10,400 plus interest.
The appellant Lynn Dixon has appealed the iudgment of the trial
court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's iudgment
with a direction to enter judgment in favor of the appellant and
against the respondent or in the alternative for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Royal Resources, Inc. filed suit against Gibralter
Financial Corporation, Gibralter Securities Corporation, Lynn
Dixon and George Perry.

(R. 2)

Lynn Dixon, the appellent, is

the only remaining party among the original defendants in the case.
Royal Resources in its amended complaint Para. 3 (R. 9) alleged
that on April 11, 1975, Royal Resources executed and delivered
to the defendant Gibralter Securities a check in the sum of $7,680.
It was further alleged on April 16, 1975, that Royal Resources
executed and delivered to Lynn Dixon, registered agent of defendant
corporation, two checks, one for $6,800 and one for $3,200.
transaction was on April lS, 1975.

This

The two checks which were

delivered to Lynn Dixon were received as Exhibits 1-P and 2-P and
provide for payment to the order of Lynn Dixon and were signed by
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-3Dee R. Woolley.

The checks are drawn on the account of Royal

Resources, Inc.

Para. 4 of the amended complaint alleged that

the sums were advanced and loaned pursuant to a previous and
ongoing course of conduct. (R. 9)

The complaint alleged that

'there remained $10, 000 unpaid on the April 16, 1975, transactions
involvinf, the two checks to Lynn Dixon plus a $400 unpaid fee and
interest.

Paragraph 7 of the amended complaint alleged that

Dixon was liable individually in that he was acting as an agent
for George Perry in his personal not corporate capacity.

Para-

graph 8 of the complaint alleged that the defendants were jointly
and individually liable for monies had and received.

A stipulation

was entered into between the appellant and respondent at the time
of trial on April 19, 1978.

The stipulation was to the effect

that the transaction of April 16, 1975 was pursuant to a course
of conduct over a period of time engaged in by brokers and especially
the corporate defendant Gibralter Securities Corporation. (R. 84)
The transaction involved a procedure in the securities trading
business known as early settlement. (R. 57)

The course of business

involved a practice whereby when Gibralter Securities made a
stock transaction involving the sale of stock, which would normally
require a seven-day settlement period, that the respondent Royal
Resources, Inc. would advance sums of money by way of early settlement
so that the customer of Gibralter could realize his money before
the seven-day period.

The early payment was discounted for cash.

In the subject transaction, funds were paid over by Royal Resources
to Lynn Dixon as the payee on the checks.

The checks were endorsed

by Lynn Dixon personally with his Utah driver's license for
identification.

(R. 57)

The checks indicate nothing further by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

way of endorsement.

Dee Woolley was the agent of the respondent

Royal Resources, Inc. and conducted the transactions for Royal
Resources.

Royal Resources, Inc. had been brought to Gibralter

to finance the "one-day pays" (R. 61) by Richard Mason who worked
for Gibralter Securities as well as having a financial involvement
with Royal Resources.
finders fee.

(R. 61)

Royal Resources paid Mason a

In effect, Royal Resources would provide cash on

a discount basis to pay out a client of Gibralter Securities who
could not wait for the seven-day period required by the
Exchange Cormnission.

Securit~s

Gibralter, in turn, would pay over the funds

at the end of the seven-day period to Royal Resources which would
make a profit on the basis of the amount discounted at the time of
making the one-day pay over to Gibralter's client.
At the time of trial, Mr. Dee Woolley, the maker of the checks
in question, testified that he had been an officer and director
of Royal Resources, Inc. (R. 62)

That the business of the respondent

was the purchase of accounts receivable from brokerage customers
of brokerage firms.

(R. 64)

Royal Resources would advance monies

to the customer of the brokerage firm and in exchange they would
receive an assignment from the customer of the proceeds of his
sale of stock.

(R. 64)

Prior to any specific transaction Woolley

would go to the bookkeeper of Gibralter Securities and determine
whether a sale transaction had taken place.

He would receive the

monies due the brokerage company's customer at the end of the
seven-day period.

He would ascertain whether the customer of the

brokerage firm had money coming by checking with Gibralter's
accountant.

(Tr. 65)

This was done in all cases and in fact in

the instant transaction he asked if a stock sale had been made
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-5and the stock sold and was advised that a sale had taken place.

(Tr. 65)

Mr. Woolley would receive a 47, fee by discounting the amount
given to the customer by that percentage.

(Tr. 66)

The appellant Lynn Dixon was president of Gibralter Securities
at the time of the transaction.

(Tr. 75)

He would handle the stock

trades for his clients on behalf of Gibralter out of a personal
trading account (Tr. 71) and would service some 2000 accounts in
that fashion.

(Tr. 71)

Dixon testified that when a customer

could not wait seven days for his money on a stock sale as required
by the Securities Exchange Commission, Dee Woolley would advance
early payment.

(Tr. 72)

Exhibits 1 and 2-P were identified as

being part of an early payment transaction.

(Tr. 68)

A trade

ticket would have been issued as part of the transaction (Tr. 68)
although none could be found at the time of trial.

The stock

would be sold in the customer's account and the check obtained
from Woolley cashed at Continental Bank and the money wired to
ilie respective parties.

(Tr. 67)

Dixon testified that he negotiated

the checks for a customer's account and wired the money to the
customer possibly using his trading account for the transaction.
(Tr. 70)

Woolley would check and see if a trade had been made

and would give a paper to Dixon that would be an assignment by
the customer or person representing the customer.

(R. 72)

When

the money would be received by Gibralter it, in turn, would be
Paid over to Royal Resources.

Dixon could not say why the money

had not been paid over to Royal Resources (R. 74) and there were
no records on the paid account.

(Tr. 74, 75)

Dixon had no

control over the pay-over of money to Royal Resources.

(R. 75-76)
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Ms. Lois Crowder testified that she was the back office manager
who kept the records of Gibralter Securities.

(R. 76)

Exhibit

P-4 was received by stipulation which was a computer printout
of the transfer of funds from Gibralter into Royal Resources.
(R. 76)

She indicated that Exhibit P-4 was kept differently

than the customer ledgers at Gibralter Securities because Royal
Resources was not actually a customer as far as stock transactions
were concerned.

(R. 77)

She indicated that she would make a

transfer to the Royal Resources account, Exhibit P-4, when a
check was issued to Royal Resources and that the transaction
involving the money paid to Mr. Dixon would not show on Exhibit
P-4 for the reason that she never issued a check to Royal Resources.
Before issuing a check, Mr. Woolley would give her a transfer and
show her the copy of the trade ticket.

She would check the stock

account and receive the written assignment and based upon those
documents issue a check to Royal Resources. (R.

78 )

Ms. Crowder

testified that there had to have been a stock transaction and
stock in the account but that she did not issue a check to Royal
Resources because Royal Resources was considered a general creditor
of Gibralter and not a customer and Gibralter Securities did not
have the money to pay over to Royal Resources.

She did not issue

a check because the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) characterized Royal Resources as a general creditor.

(R. 78,BC).

She said that there was a stock transaction but since Royal
Resources was not considered a customer but a general creditor
. . s

they had to be paid out of the general funds of Gibralter Secuntie
and that Gibralter went broke.

(R. 80,81).

She stated the

reason
that
Royal
Resources
notprovided
paidby the
the
money
due and
itLibrary
on Services
a
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library.
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-7stock transaction was because the funds were held by Gibralter in
a general account and when Gibralter went broke there were no
funds to pay over to Royal Resources.

(R. 83)

A stipulation was entered into between counsel that on
several occasions Mr. Dee Woolley went to Gibralter Securities
and requested payment from the firm for the amounts in dispute
and that at no time did he request payment from Mr. Dixon although
Dixon was present on one occasion.

(R. 84)

Prior to trial, respondent moved for the production of all
records and transactions between the defendants and plaintiffs during
the period of January 1, 1975, through June 30, 1975.

(R. 26)

Thereafter, plaintiff sought a coercive order from the court to
compel compliance with the motion to produce documents.

(R. 35)

In response Lynn Dixon filed an affidavit in which he indicated
that he was not nor had he ever been the custodian of the records
of Gibralter Financial Corporation or Gibralter Securities Corporation,

and that he had none of the records in his possession.

At the

time of trial, the appellant Lyrtn Dixon testified that he was
employed in an entirely new occupation and had no records concerning
the transaction.

(R. 66, 70)

Based upon the above evidence, the trial court found that
"the facts surrounding the transactions in this case in the absence
of clarifying documents were peculiarly in the province and knowledge
of" appellant Dixon.

That the failure to produce documents raises

apresumption that their contents are adverse to the defendants,
(R. 46-47) and that because the checks were payable to Dixon

(identified· as defendant in the Findings of Fact) that in the
absence of documents or evidence to the contrary a conclusion
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that the monies were had and received by Dixon was proper.

This

failure to produce documents shifted the burden of proof to the
defendants and that they did not meet the burden.

(R. 46-47)

In

the conclusions of law, the court found that "the failure to
produce essential documents through discovery and at the trial [sic]
is construed as a matter of law to determine the contents" adversely
to the defendants and that Dixon was liable in the amount of
$10,400.

The inference against Dixon was apparently based on a

failure to produce by all defendants.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE APPELLANT PERSONALLY
LIABLE FOR FUNDS RECEIVED IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN AGENT.
The trial court rendered judgment against Lynn Dixon in his
individual capacity.

It is submitted that the judgment of the

trial court is erroneous in that the evidence clearly establishes that
Lynn Dixon's receipt of monies from the respondent Royal Resources,
Inc. was not in an individual capacity but in his capacity as an
agent for Gibralter Securities and the clients of Gibralter Securities.
Further, it is submitted that the facts clearly demonstrate that
Dee Woolley of Royal Resources dealt with Lynn Dixon in a stock
transaction for a one-day payout knowing that Dixon was an agent
of Gibralter Securities and acting on behalf of a third person
selling their stock.

The very nature of the transaction envisioned

a payment by Lynn Dixon over to the seller of stock in exchange
for an assignment to Royal Resources of the seller's right to
receive payment at the end of seven days.

The only reason that

Royal Resources did not receive payment was because they were
considered a general creditor of Gibralter Securities, and when
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-9paid over to Royal Resources were no J.onger available.

Dee

Woolley appeared at Gibralter Securities at a time when Lynn Dixon
was present and made demand upon Gibralter Securities for pa)'!Ilent.
At no time did he make demand on Lynn Dixon personally.

In the

respondent's amended complaint, it is alleged .that the funds were
paid over "pursuant to a previous and ongoing course of conduct."
The allegation is that "the funds were loaned to the defendants"
without identifying Lynn Dixon.

With reference to the specific

allegation as to Lynn Dixon's liability, Paragraph 7 of the
respondent's amended complaint alleges ". . . Dixon is liable
individually in that he was acting as an agent of George Perry
in his personal not corporate capacity."

Thus, it is clear

from all of the evidence that Lynn Dixon was acting as an agent.
The Restatement of Agency 2d,

§

320 provides:

"Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or
purporting to make a contract with another as
agent for a disclosed principal does not become
a party to the contract."

.es. Aprincipal is disclosed according to Comment a of the Restatement

of Agency 2d, § 320, when the other party has notice that the

agent is acting for a principal and the principal' s identity.
Comment a also provides:
"One who purports to contract on behalf of a
designated person does not manifest by this
that he is making a contract on his own account,
and only where he so manifests does the agent
become a party to a contract which he makes
for the principal. In the absence of other
facts, the inference is that the parties have
agreed that the principal is, and the agent
is not, a party."
Section 328 of the Restatement of Agency 2d adds:

"An agent, by making a contract only on behalf
of a competent disclosed or partially disclosed
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney Law
Library.he
Funding
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-10Comment a to Section 328 of the Restatement of Agency 2d observes:
"One who makes a contract only on account of
another ordinarily does not himself contemplate
responsibility for its performance. His function
is performed if he causes a contract to be made
between his principal and the third person. He
uarantees neither the honest nor the solvenCt e principa .
Emp asis a
Generally, an agent is not responsible for money had and received
where the money is paid over by the agent to his principal.
3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, §§ 301, 302.

In 3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, § 294,

the general rule is stated:
"If a contract is made with a known agent
acting within the scope of his authority for
a disclosed principal, the contract is that
of the principal alone and the agent cannot
be held liable thereon, unless credit has been
given expressly and exclusively to the agent
and it appears that it was clearly his intention to assume the obligation as a personal
liability and that he has been informed that
credit has been extended to him alone."
Cases applying these principles have generally rejected claims
of liability against persons such as the appellant who were
acting simply as an agent for a third person.
In Merit Motors v. Bartholomew, 179 Pa. Super. 576, 118 A.2d
277 (1955), plaintiff, an automobile seller, brought action on the
purchase price of an automobile against the buyer, and against
Allstate Insurance Company on the theory that the insurance companv
had agreed to finance the sale.

In holding that plaintiff could

not recover against Allstate, the court cited § 320 of the
Restatement of Agency and stated:
"It is well established that a person acting as
an agent for a disclosed principal is not, in
the absence of special circumstances, a party
to the contract."
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-11Asimilar result was reached holding the president of a corporation
not liable on a corporate printing debt, Revere Press, Inc. v.
~·

431 Pa. 370, 246 A.2d 407 (1968).

A decision from the Wyoming Supreme Court is instructive in this
case in view of the express allegation in respondent's complaint
that Dixon acted as an agent.

In reversing a judgment the court

observed, Thomas v. Gonzelas, 79 Wyo. 111, 331 P.2d 832, 834 (1958):
"The amended petition is ambiguous. It
fails to state a clear cause of action against
Emett Thomas. It is therein alleged that Emett
Thomas acted as agent for the Cheevers in ordering
electrical equipment, impliedly asserting that he
did so within the scope of his authority. It is
stated in 2 Restatement, Agency, § 328, ~- 724:
'An agent, by making a contract only on behalf
of a competent disclosed or partially disclosed
principal whom he has power so to bind, does not
thereby become liable for its nonperformance.'
In the comment to that section it is said:
'One who makes a contract only on
account of another ordinarily does not
himself contemplate responsibility for
its performance. His function is performed if he causes a contract to be made
between his principal and the third
person. * * *'
In 3 C.J.S. Agency,

§

215, p. 119, it is stated:

'An agent who contracts on behalf of a
disclosed principal and within the scope of
his authroity, in the absence of an agreement
otherwise, or other circumstances showing
that he has expressly or impliedly incurred
or intended to incur personal responsibility,
is not personally liable to the other contracting party * * *'
There is no allegation in the second amended petition
which discloses that the appellant Emett Thomas
intended to bind himself personally."
In Roller v. Smith, 88 N.M. 572, 544 P.2d 287 (1975), the New
Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiff had no claim for
relief
against the defendant agent for the balance due on the
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-12sale of an automobile.

The court stated:

"[I]t is well established that an agent acting
within his authority for a disclosed principal
is not personally liable unless he was expressly
made a party to the contract or unless he conducts
himself in such a manner as to indicate an intent
to be bound."
From these cases and the facts of the instant case, it appears
that as a matter of law, the trial court erred in imposing
liability against Lynn Dixon.

Dixon was acknowledged as a

"registered agent" for defendant corporation in plaintiff's
amended complaint. (R. 9)

It was stipulated that demand was

made by plaintiff for payment from Gibralter Securities and
not Dixon.

Dee Woolley who made out the checks payable from

respondent to Lynn Dixon acknowledged that it was his practice
to determine from Gibralter Securities if a stock sale had been
made before making the one-day loan and that he did so as regards
the instant transaction.

(R. 65)

Mr. Woolley's dealings were

part of a course of dealing with Gibralter Securities and he
would take an assignment of the client's right to payment.

(R.

66) The appellant gave over the money to the stock seller, and
his trader's account was simply a vehicle to service Gibralter
Securities clients.

In accord with practice when Gibralter

received the money from the stock sale, it would be paid over to
Royal Resources.
Resources.

Dixon had no control over the pay over to Royal

Before a payover would be made, Dee Woolley would

present Lois Crowder of Gibralter Securities with a transfer and
trade ticket.

The reason payment was not made by Gibralter in the

instant situation was because Gibralter did not have the money to
pay off its general creditors.

These facts clearly show no

liability
on the
partFunding
of Dixon
since
heby was
merely
an and
agent.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DRAWING AN EVIDENTIARY CONCLUSION
FROM THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS WHERE THE DOCUMENTS
WERE NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE APPELLANT AND WERE AS
EQUALLY ACCESSIBLE TO THE RESPONDENT AS THE APPELLANT
IF THEY WERE IN FACT IN EXISTENCE.
Prior to trial, respondent moved for production of all records
and transactions between plaintiff and defendants during the period
from January 1, 1975 through June 30, 1975.
was addressed generally to the "defendants."

The production request
In response to the

motion, the appellant filed an affidavit in which he indicated
that he was not nor had he been the custodian of the records of
i

G~ralter

Financial Corporation or Gibralter Securities Corporation

and that he had none of the records in his possession.

At the

time of trial, the appellant testified that he was employed in
anew occupation and had no records concerning the transaction.
In paragraph 6 of the appellant's affidavit, he stated:
"Affiant continues to stand ready to give
testimony, depositions, and affidavits on
behalf of Plaintiff but cannot produce
documents that have not been in his care
and custody or his possession from the
closing of Gibralter Securities Corp."
Further, based upon the testimony of Lois Crowder, the critical
records dealing with the respondent's right to payment would be
the assignment and the trade ticket and the records of the
transaction would be in the individual customers account.

Thus,

some of the critical records would be in the possession of Royal
Resources, Inc.

Even so, the trial court found that the facts

surrounding the transaction in the case were peculiarly within
the province of the appellant Dixon.

Based on this finding, the

court concluded that the failure to produce the documents raised
.ant.
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-14and that the burden of proof was shifted to Dixon concerning the
transaction.

It is submitted that this constituted a misapplica-

tion of the evidentiary law justifying this court reversing and
granting a new trial.

In 31 C.J.S. Evidence

§

156(b) it is

stated:
"The unexplained failure or refusal
of a party to judicial proceedings to
produce relevant and competent documentary
evidence or an article which would tend to
throw light on the issues authorizes, under
certain circumstances, an inference or a
presumption unfavorable to such party.
Possession or control of such evidence by
the party against whom the inference or
presumption is sought to be invoked, is
necessary; the rule does not apply where
the evidence is equally available to both
parties. Further, it must appear that
there has been an actual suppression or
withholding of the evidence; no unfavorable
inference arises where the circumstances
indicate that the document or article in
question has been lost or accidentally
destroyed, or where the failure to produce
it is otherwise properly accounted for."
See inferentially, Mcintyre v. The Ajax Mining Co., 17 Utah 213,
53 Pac. 1124 (1898).

See also, 29 Am.Jur. 2d Evidence

§

178.

It is well settled that before any adverse inference can be drawn
from the non-production of evidence that the evidence in question
must be identified and must be peculiarly within the power of
one party to produce.

In the instant case, Dixon had no access

to the records of Gibralter Securities nor was there any showing
of any documentation actually in existence which would have
clarified the matter which was within the power of Dixon to
produce.

Indeed, the records of Gibralter Securities were as

accessible to respondent as they were to Dixon.

Further,

respondent had access to particular documents such as trade
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-15bearing upon the issue.

In Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed. § 3.93,

it is stated:
"No unfavorable inference arises from a
failure to produce evidence which is not
within the control of the party who has
failed to produce it, . . . "
It is therefore submitted that under the facts before the trial
court, there was no basis to draw an unfavorable inference or
presumption with reference to any claimed failure of the appellant
to produce documents relating to the transaction in question.
Even so, it is submitted that such a negative inference cannot
shift the burden of proof nor affirmatively establish the plaintiff's
case.

In 31 C.J.S. Evidence§ 156, it is stated:
"Inferences from the suppression of documents
or failure to produce them on notice increase
the weight of evidence produced by the other
party as to the contents of the documents, or
as to the facts to which the documents are
relevent, but do not constitute independent
evidence of a fact."

29 C.J.S. Am.Jur. 2d § 177 states the rule:

"While the spoliation of evidence may raise a
presumption or inference against the party guilty
of such act, it does not relieve the other party
from introducing evidence tending affirmatively
to prove his case, insofar as he has the
burden of proof. This presumption or
inference does not amount to substantive
proof and cannot take the place of proof
of a fact necessary to the other party's
cause."
~e

also, 1 Jones on Evidence, § 3.93, p. 329.

~d

Accident Insurance Co. v. Eddings, 188 Tenn. 512, 221 S.W.2d

In National Life

695 (1949), Eddings sued the defendant insurance company to

recover on an industrial insurance policy.

The company defended

on the grounds that plaintiff had not been in sound health at the

time the policy was taken out.

On appeal, the issue before the
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Tennessee Court was how far the inference arising from a party's
failure to produce evidence may supply evidence against such
person.

The plaintiff Eddings had refused to consent to the

taking of depositions of his treating physicians who had provided
treatment for him immediately prior to the time he took out a
policy with the defendant.

The insurance company contended

that in addition to the unfavorable inference from the failure to
produce such evidence which was peculiarly within the plaintiff's
control, that such inference was sufficient to establish the facts
of the defense of the defendant insurance company.

The Tennessee

Court indicated that such evidence "does not amount to substantive
proof which can be substituted for a fact required to make out
his adversaries case

>'< '~

·t<

it cannot be treated as affirmative

evidence of a fact otherwise unproved."

The court also indicated

that the presumption or inference from the non-production of
evidence is not sufficient to supply independent evidence of a
fact unproved by other evidence.

The court stated the rule:

"Thus, the failure to produce books and papers
which have been called for does not raise the
inference that, if produced, they would establish
the facts which it is alleged they would prove.
The only inference that may be drawn is that the
testimony if given would not have been favorable
to the party who did not produce the evidence.
Evidence of such conduct is persuasive rather
than probative and cannot be invoked as substantive proof of any facts essential to the
case of the opponent. The rule has been stated
that the presumption will not supply a missing
link in an adversary's case and cannot be treated
as independent evidence of a fact otherwise
unproved. It has been stated that the presumption
arising from the nonproduction of evidence does
not relieve the other party from the burden of
proving his case."
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-17In the instant case, the effect of the ruling of the trial court
was to relieve Royal Resources of the normal plaintiff's burden
of proving its claim for relief and to substitute a negative
inference as substantive proof.

This is contrary to the accepted

rule with reference to the use of inferences from the non--production
of evidence.

The rule with reference to non-production of evidence

is a mere inference not a true presumption, Presumptions in Utah:
ASearch for Certainty, 5 Utah L.Rev. 196 (1956); Wigmore, Evidence,
3d Ed. § 2424, § 291, p. 182; Utah Rules of Evidence 13 and 14.
As

the New Hampshire court recognized in Stocker v. Boston and

Maine Railroad, 84 N.H. 377, 151 A. 457, 459 (1930), it">'<** is
no more than saying that proof must rest upon evidence and not
upon its absence."

The burden of proof does not shift under

these circumstances, Rule 1 (4) Utah Rules of Evidence.

In Koes ling

v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975), this Court observed:

"The burden of persuasion does not shift,
however, and remains upon the party asserting
the proposition. Thus, where, as here, the
proponent has the burden of persuading the
trier of fact by a preponderance of the
evidence, that is, that the asserted proposition is more likely than not, he carries that
burden throughout the trial. Having adduced
sufficient evidence to show or tending to
show the existence of the proposition, and
having thus met his burden of production, he
nevertheless suffers the risk of nonpersuasion
or disbelief.
It is submitted this court should reverse and grant a new trial.
POINT III
THE RESPONDENT WAS PRECLUDED FROM HAVING JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE APPELLANT WHEN IT PREVIOUSLY TOOK
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE TWO CORPORATE DEFENDANTS.

The plaintiff below, Royal Resources, Inc., in its amended
complaint named Gibralter Financial Corporation, Gibralter Securities
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-BGeorge Perry was released from the action at trial.

The amended

complaint listed Lynn Dixon as registered agent of defendant
corporation, listed the monies paid over as short-term loans to
defendants and indicated that the defendants were jointly liable.
(R. 9, 10, etc.)

On the 22nd of July, 1977, while the action was

still pending against the appellant Dixon, Royal Resources took
judgment against both corporate defendants for the same aMount
and on the same causes of action as was eventually involved in the
judgment against the appellant Dixon.

In that judgment, it was

expressly indicated that Dixon and Perry would agree to fully
cooperate with plaintiffs in seeking redress from a Federal

a~ency,

SCIPIC (Securities Investor Protection Corporation) for the
purposes of obtaining federal insurance compensation for the
loss.

(R. 24)

In his affidavit of March 6, 1978, Dixon indicated

a further willingness to assist Royal Resources in the satisfaction
of its judgment by recovery against SCIPIC.

Thereafter, the

respondent continued to pursue its action against Dixon.
It is submitted that respondent cannot have judgment against
Gibralter Securities Corporation, Gibralter Financial Corporation
and the appellant Dixon.

The Restatement of Contracts § 119(1)

provides:
"A judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction within the United States against
one or more joint promisors, or against one or
more joint and several promisors, upon a joint
promise, discharges the joint duty of the other
joint promisors."
This rule is applicable to actions against a principal and an
agent.

Restatement of Agency 2d, § 336b.

See also Corrnnent e.
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-19rnJAm.Jur. 2d Agency,§ 309, i t is stated:
"[T]he rule followed almost universally is
that if the third party, after learning the
facts and the identity of the principal,
brings suit and recovers judgment against the
agent, this is an election against the agent
which will bar a subsequent action against
the principal, regardless of whether the
judgment is or is not satisfied. A judgment
against the principal will likewise have the
effect of barring a subsequent action by the
third person against the agent."
In the instant case, it is submitted that judgment cannot be
had against the corporate defendants and their agent Dixon for the
same indebtedness.

If Dixon was a fully disclosed agent of Gibralter

Securities, judgment may not be had against him as only the principal
is liable.

If Dixon were deemed an agent for a partially disclosed

or undisclosed principal, judgment may not be had against both

the agent and the principal.
an election.

Rather, the plaintiff must make

In Costello v. Kasteler, 7 Utah 2d 310, 324 P.2d 772

(1958), this Court recognized the rule before referenced and

indicated that prior Utah authority, Love v. St. Joseph Stock Yards
~.

fu

51 Utah 305, 169 Pac. 951 (1917), supported the same conclusion.

the Costello case, this court stated:

"Appellants further contend that the court
erred in granting judgment against both of them
since the court found that at the time of the
negotiations for the services appellant Kasteler
did not disclose to respondent that he was acting
as the agent for the appellant Uranium Chemical
Corporation and the law is well settled that where
a contract is entered into with the agent of an
undisclosed principal for the use and benefit
of the principal an election must be made as to
whether the agent or the principal will be held
liable, but a judgment cannot be obtained against
both. As authority appellant cites Love v. St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co., 51 Utah 305, 169 P. 951.
That case does contain a dictum to that effect
and respondent concedes that the majority rule
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-20after discovery of an undisclosed principal a
judgment cannot ordinarily be obtained against
both the principal and the agent. As stated
in 118 A.L.R., page 704, note 111:
'It has generally been held that
where the agent and undisclosed principal
are joined, the plaintiff may not have
judgment against both, but must, prior
to jud~ent, elect to hold one or the
other.
Ordinarily plaintiff would not be entitled to
judgment against both."
In the case the Court went on to note that a failure to demand an
election might constitute a waiver.

However, the Court indicated

that an election could be made on remand.

It is submitted, however,

that in the instant case respondent has in fact made an election.
Respondent saw fit to take judgment first against Gibralter
Securities and to enlist the aid of the appellant Dixon in
satisfying the judgment through a claim against SCIPIC.

This

conduct certainly was in the nature of an election and precludes
a judgment from being entered against the appellant Dixon.
Restatement of Agency 2d, § 210a.

It is therefore submitted

that this Court should reverse with instructions to enter judgment
in favor of the appellant.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case clearly establishes that the
appellant Lynn Dixon acted as an agent for Gibralter Securities.
The testimony of respondent's officer Dee Woolley, the principal
party acting for respondent in the transaction in question and the
testimony of all other persons shows appellant received no personal
gain from monies had and received from respondent.

The monies

were received as an agent and respondent was entitled to compensation
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-21Under these circumstances, no judgment of individual liability was
properly rendered against Dixon and appellant submits that the
case should be reversed with directions to enter judgment in
favor of Dixon.

Appellant further submits that the trial court

misapplied an evidentiary standard in determining that negative
inferences could be drawn against appellant from the failure to
produce documents where the documents were not shown to be in
existence or subject to production by appellant Lynn Dixon.
Further, even if an evidentiary inference could have been drawn,
the trial court acted improperly in suggesting that it shift the
burden of proof and in effect provide substantive evidence in
support of the respondent's case.

Finally, it is submitted that

respondent could not have judgment against both the principals
and agent in this case and having taken judgment first against
the principal and thereafter seeking the agent's aid in the
satisfaction of that judgment is precluded in having judgment
against the agent Lynn Dixon.

It is therefore submitted this

Court should reverse.
Respectfully
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